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Abstract: Using a longitudinal database (1996-2003) at the plant level, this paper aims 
to shed light on the causal nexus between production-related subsidies and exports, in 
Portugal.  Given  that  there  is  a  selection  of  firms  for  subsidies  we  implement  a 
propensity  score  matching  approach  in  order  to  evaluate  adequately  the  effects  of 
subsidies  on  both  the  probability  of  domestic  firms  to  begin  exporting  and  on  the 
probability of increasing the export share of already exporters. At one hand, we find no 
impact of subsidies on the ability of domestic firms to become exporters; at the other 
hand,  some  evidence  of  positive  effects  of  subsidies  are  detected  on  export  shares, 
especially for higher levels of subsidy per employee and for specific sectors as a clear 
sectoral  heterogeneity  is  observed.  Complementarily,  some  weak  positive  effects  of 
subsidies are noticed in employment but no evidence is observed for firms´ sales or 
efficiency. 
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1. Introduction 
Exports are decisive for economic growth, especially in downturn cycles when 
domestic aggregate demand is weak. At the other hand, it is well known that firms, in 
order to export, must overcome several difficulties and costs. So, most governments 
apply various export promotion policies, even if direct export subsidization is forbidden 
by  World  Trade  Organization  (WTO)  rules.  In  this  framework,  general  production-
related subsidies may have an important role in promoting exports, without violating 
WTO rules. Complementarily, some recent theoretical models (e.g., Melitz, 2003 or 
Chaney,  2008)  and  some  recent  empirical  studies  (e.g.,  Wagner,  2007)  found  the 
existence of entry sunk costs of exporting; such costs could be surpassed through the 
benefits of public supports like subsidies. In this line, export promotion policies may 
enhance domestic firms to exporting activities.    
However, there are few proofs that governmental exporting promotional policies 
are, indeed, effective in removing or at least reducing such difficulties to exports. This 
lack  of  evidence  may  result  from  the  fact  that  there  are  diverse  institutional 
arrangements (both formal and informal designed to help reducing such sunk costs of 
exporting) deriving complex the task of distinguish the mechanisms which are effective 
in promoting exports and which are not; moreover, such complexity may open path to 
misuses,  abuses  (e.g.,  Nogués,  1989)  and  even  for  a  practical  impossibility  of 
controlling firms´ subsidies.  
Also important is the fact that the existence of complete data, at the firm level, on 
public  subsidies  designed  to  help  exporting  is  scarce,  making  difficult  such  test. 
Additionally, there is a methodological difficulty to such test given that it is impossible 
to observe the same firms with and without such subsidies and supports; in fact, only 
indirectly the impact of public support to exports has been analyzed. All these facts 
increase the doubt on this subject: are public policies of export promotion ineffective or 
are we not methodologically able to obtain proofs of it? 
In  line  with  some  few  and  recent  papers  (which  investigate  such  mentioned 
connections between production-subsidies and exports), we use large firm level datasets 
and matching procedures (as. Gorg et al., 2008 for Irish firms or Girma et al., 2009a for 
German firms). The main motivation of this paper is to present significant evidence of 
the links between production related subsidies granted to Portuguese firms and their 2 
 
export  performance.  In  order  to  do  it,  we  use  the  most  representative  panel  data 
available for manufacturing firms in Portugal for the period 1996-2003 and we apply a 
propensity score matching approach to uncover the nexus of causality from subsidies to 
exports. 
The main contribution of this paper to the related literature is to present, for the 
first time, for Portuguese firms evidences of the relationships between subsidies and 
exports.  In  line  with  previous  conclusions,  for  other  countries,  we  also  notice  that 
production subsidies have little impact on the probability of domestic firms to begin 
exporting. Moreover, we also found some evidence that only high levels of subsidies 
per employee may have the ability to increase, for already exporters, their share of 
exports in total sales.    
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a brief summary 
on the main related literature. Section 3 describes the data used for this study. Section 4 
presents some evidence on subsidies and exports in Portuguese firms. In Section 5 we 
present the main econometric results obtained. Section 6 presents a brief extension of 
the analysis of subsidies effects on other firms´ variables. Section 7 concludes.    
 
2. Literature on subsidies and exports 
Theoretically, export subsidies can increase exports as they may help to support 
some of the exporting inherent costs; moreover, subsidies could also support an higher 
price level for exporters, thus inducing more sales and eventually more earnings. Of 
course, export subsidies present also some dangers namely when their allocation relies 
on subjective mechanisms based on arbitrary decisions, case in which the competition 
among firms in order to obtain them may instead generate negative impacts
4.  
Despite the importance of public policies to promote exporting activities, there 
are, however, few empirical studies that have investigated this issue. A first wave of 
such empirical studies relied on industry level–data
5 and only recently firm-level data 
begun to be used for such type of studies. In 2000, Alvarez and Crespi studied the 
activity of the Chilean export promotion agency with direct firm-level sample data and 
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found a positive effect of such public policies on firms´ exports (both in the extensive 
margins and in intensive margin). Bernard and Jensen (2004) studied the determinants 
of  exporting  activity  in  the  US,  investigating  amongst  other  things,  whether  export 
promotion expenditures at the state level influenced the decision of US plants to export 
or not; their findings suggest little evidence that such policies are able to encourage 
participation of US domestic manufacturers in the global market. By contrast, Martincus 
and Carballo (2008) and Helmers and Trofimenko (2009) still using exports subsidies, 
find some positive effects on export performances of such subsidies, using firm level 
data for Peru and Colombia, respectively.  
Other studies, not disposing of direct data on export promotion subsidies, opt to 
study  instead  the  effects  of  overall  production-related  subsidies  on  firms´  export 
performance. Gorg et al. (2008) found, for Irish firms that production subsidies were not 
capable  to  motivate  domestic  firms  to  become  exporters;  nevertheless,  they  found 
subsidies, with a minimum level, being able to enhance the performance of already 
exporters. Girma et al. (2009b) had found similar results for Chinese as they noticed 
production subsidies stimulate exports of already exporting capital intensive firms. In 
2009,  applying  a  matching  approach  to  investigate  the  causal  effect  of  production 
subsidies on export activities, Girma et al. (2009a) also found no impact of subsidies on 
the probability a domestic firms to start exporting but they also found weak evidence for 
a positive impact of subsidies on the growth of the share of exports in total sales, in 
West Germany but no evidence in East Germany. 
 
3. Data  
Production-subsidies are financial assistance that firms receive from government, 
local authorities or from European Union aiming to lower firms´ production costs and 
the  prices  of  produced  goods  or  even  to  provide  a  proper  payment  for  factors  of 
production. In accounting terms Government grants are assistance by government in the 
form of transfer resources to an enterprise, in return for past or future compliance of 
certain conditions related to the operational activities of the company. It is important to 
remark that these production subsidies are not specifically created to promote exports.  4 
 
Our data source is the Portuguese National Statistics Institute (INE) balance sheet 
information  (IAE).  IAE  provides  information  of  firms’  balance  sheets,
6  and  uses  a 
survey sample of  all manufacturing Portuguese firms, from 1996-2003. We used  as 
variables:  number  of  employees,  turnover,  production-subsidies,  imports,  exports, 
number of employees specifically devoted to R&D activities, foreign capital, capital, 
labour costs, earnings. Firms are classified according to their main activity, as identified 
by INE standard codes (CAE), which are correlated with Eurostat Nace 1.1 taxonomy. 
Despite being unbalanced, our database contains information for an average of 4,500 
firms  per  year.  Capital  is  proxied  by  tangible  fixed  assets  at  book  value  (net  of 
depreciation). All nominal variables are measured in 1996 Euros and are deflated using 
2 digit industry-level price indices provided by INE; for capital stock we use the same 
deflator for all sectors. 
Given that we needed a firm-level productivity measure and since it is highly 
probable that profit-maximizing firms immediately adjust their input levels, each time 
they  notice  productivity  shocks,  productivity  and  input  choices  are  likely  to  be 
correlated and thus Total Factor Productivity (TFP) estimation involves problems. Thus, 
in line with several authors (e.g., Maggioni, 2009), TFP is estimated using the semi-
parametric  method  of  Levinsohn  and  Petrin  (2003).  This  method  recognizes  the 
simultaneity bias as firms observe the productivity shocks but econometricians do not. 
Thus, we compute TFP as the residual of a Cobb-Douglas production function in which: 
the  firm  value  added  is  the  independent  variable;  capital,  labour  and  unobservable 
productivity  level  are  the  dependent  ones.  Besides,  this  method  assumes  that 
intermediate inputs present a monotonic positive relationship with productivity and thus 
could be used as proxies for TFP. Given data availability, we use intermediate inputs as 
the deflated values of “supplies and services consumed from thirds” at book value. We 
estimate production function for every 2-digit sector separately. 
 
 
                                                           
6 Since 2004, INE has changed its methodology and works with the universe of Portuguese manufacturing 
firms but before 2004 the only data available is the one we use. INE ensures the representativity of the 
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4. Evidences on exports and subsidies  
Table 1 shows that, in the period 1996-2003 26% of Portuguese firms received 
production-related subsidies, at least for one year. Of the firms receiving subsidies 80% 
were already exporters and only 20% non-exporters. The status of subsidized firm is 
highly stable; in fact, subsidies´ support was persistent as 31% of all subsidized firms 
reported to have obtained operating subsidies in each and every year and more than half 
of firms had subsidies for at least 6 years out of 8 (Table 2). 
Table 1 – Production-Subsidies in Portuguese firms (1996-2003) 
Firms with subsidies  Firms without subsidies  Total of firms observed 
 
2,831 (26%)  7,922 (74%)  10,753 (100%) 
 
Source: Own calculations 
 




8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1 
% of firms 
subsidized 
 
31%  9%  9%  10%  10%  12%  9%  10% 
Source: Own calculations 
 
Subsidies represented, on average for that period, 1,4% of sales for subsidized 
firms  but  there  was  a  time  heterogeneity  as  reflected  in  Table  3.  A  sectoral 
heterogeneity was also observed as firms belonging to sectors like: food and beverage, 
furniture and recycling sectors obtained the higher values of subsidies per sales and in 
most cases the higher values of subsidies per employees (Appendix A).  
 
Table 3 – Subsidies by year and employee 





1,8%  1,8%  1,4%  1,3%  1,1%  2,2%  0,9%  0,8% 
Subsidy by 
employee (€) 
232  243  280  258  291  178  185  189 




Subsidies,  for  subsidized  firms,  are  much  concentrated.  For  Portuguese  firms, 
international trade and subsidies are much more concentrated than employment or sales, 
as measured by the Theil index for inequality assessment (Table 4). 
Table 4 – Concentration of Portuguese firms’ employees, sales, trade and production 
subsidies (average 1996-2003) 
Variable  Theil Index 
Employees  0.68 
Sales  1.43 
Exports  2.33 
Imports  2.52 
Subsidies  2.35 
Source: Own calculations. 
For the same period, we analyzed firm heterogeneity in association with trade 
status, considering exporting and importing activities. For that purpose, in each year, all 
firms were classified into four mutually exclusive categories/groups: Non-Traders (NT), 
Only  Exporters  (OE),  Only  Importers  (OI)  and  Two-Way  Traders  (TWT).  In  our 
database around 74% of firms are engaged in international activities and the propensity 
to export was on average of 63% while the propensity to import was of 69%.  Along 
1996-2003, the degree of global engagement of Portuguese firms grew as in 1996, TWT 
represented 45% of firms, but in 2003 they corresponded to 53. There is also clear 
evidence that NT and TWT status appear to be highly stable, while the OE and OI status 
seem to be more unstable
7. Nevertheless, the time persistency of our exporting firms 
was, on average, of 3.8 over 8 years of our sample data-time lag. Moreover, 18% of 
firms were exporters for every single year of the whole period, “persistent exporters”, 
while 25% exported in only one single year. 
Subsidies and exports are positively related as observed in Table 5. We use as 
dependent variables in column (1) and line (1) a dummy for exporter status in each year 
and in column (1 ) and line (2) a variable for export shares in total sales; each of those 
variables are regressed on a constant, a dummy for subsidized firms, sectoral codes and 
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size. In column (2) similar regressions are performed but firm fixed effects are added. 
We perform regressions using logit models for export status dummy and fractional logit 
models  for  export  shares
8.  All  regression  coefficients  are  positive  and  statistically 
significant, even when controlling for firm fixed effects and sectoral and time effects. 
These  positive  coefficients  mean  that  subsidized  firms,  when  compared  with  non-
subsidized  firms,  are  more  probably  exporters  (first  line  of  regressions)  and  among 
exporters  subsidized  firms  present  a  higher  share  of  exports  relative  to  total  sales 
(second line of regressions). The consistency of such coefficients is confirmed by the 
fact that, although not reported, such correlation is observable for each and every year 
between 1996 and 2003. However, those positive coefficients do not mean the existence 
of any causality relationship between subsidies and exports.  




Subsidized firms (dummy) 
Independent variable: 
Subsidized firms (dummy) 
(firms fixed effects) 












Source: Own calculations. 
 
5. Evaluating the effects of subsidies on exports 
In order to investigate the causal effects of production-related subsidies on the 
probability  to  export  and  on  export  shares  of  total  sales,  we  must  use  a  different 
methodology, beyond regression analysis. In fact, the alleged positive relationship may 
be the result of both causality directions: (i) on one hand, a production-subsidy may 
help firms to support fixed costs related with the beginning of exporting activities or to 
deal  with  particular  markets´  difficulties;  moreover,  subsidies  have  the  ability  of 
reducing some variable costs of already exporters thus inducing an increase in export 
shares in total sales; (ii) at the other hand, new exporting firms or firms reaching to 
export  to  particular  destinations  may  gain  the  right  to  collect  some  subsidies  that 
governments use to reward such performances.  Thus, the causality may run in both 
directions;  not  to  mention  the  fact  that  there  may  exist  other  firms´  characteristics 
                                                           
8 We use fractional logit models given the fact that the share of exports in total sales is a percentage 
variable with a high probability at zero due to the large share of firms with no exports. See Papke and 
Wooldrige (1996) 8 
 
beyond  subsidies  and  exports  that  can  influence  simultaneously  both:  Girma  et  al. 
(2009a) mention as a clear example of such variables the influence of R&D activities on 
this issue. 
Other important fact to remember when dealing with such methodological issues 
is that subsidies are not given to firms at random but instead their allocation is (or 
should be) the result of a conscious selection from governments. In fact, we can admit 
two opposite selection methods: (i) one relies on the fact that subsidies are  granted 
conditional  on  the  observation  of  some  criteria
9  that  firms  must  fill,  like:  certain 
products  exported,  certain  types  of  workforce  employed,  certain  markets  achieved, 
certain types of firms or sales from certain regions of the country; (ii) the other selection 
method  relies  on  the  possibility  of  subsidies  to  be  granted  on  the  basis  of  firms´ 
connectedness and proximity with Government or public officials and related members. 
Although opposites both introduce a selection criteria on subsidized firms thus requiring 
other methods than simple regression analysis in order to properly evaluate the effects 
of subsidies on firms´ performances. 
   Additionally,  by  assuming  subsidies  (whatever  form  they  have)  are  not 
randomly  given  to  firms  means  one  cannot  assess  their  effects  simply  by  a  simple 
comparison  between  subsidized  and  non-subsidized  firms.  In  line  with  Girma  et  al. 
(2009a), we argue that this situation closely claims for the use of matching methods. In 
fact,  the  ideal  method  for  evaluating  subsidies´  effects  would  be  to  compare  two 
situations for the same firm: (i) its performances in some year – e.g., exports – in the 
case it had received a public subsidy with, (ii) the performance on the same moment had 
it not received such support, which would be the counterfactual situation. Given that the 
information about the counterfactual will never be available, several authors (in line 
with  Heckman  et  al.  1998)  argue  that  an  adequate  way  to  obtain  an  appropriate 
evaluation on the effects of the subsidies is to build a “control group” of firms that did 
not  receive  subsidies  in  that  year  but  was  as  similar  as  possible  with  those  firms 
receiving subsidies in that moment (the treated ones or starters).  
By  using  matching  techniques,  we  hope  to  build  consistent  counterfactuals  to 
every subsidy “starter”, while using a generic non-subsidized firm as the comparison 
                                                           
9  Sometimes  the  complexity  or  opacity  of  those  criteria  can  create  situations  of  negative  effects  of 
subsidies on firms´ performances given the fact that some of them feel discouraged from applying for 
subsides (see Helmers and Trofimenko, 2009, for further discussion). 9 
 
group would not allow us to make causal inferences, since the observed differences after 
subsidies begin could exist previously in a pre-subsidy period and remain after it. 
Assuming the possibility of building such group of control firms, then we would 
match every treated firm with one or several control firms (the most similar to the first) 
and  therefore  we  would  assume  that  differences  between  both  performances  in  the 
future to be the result of such treatment (subsidy) that one firm received and the other 
(control) did not.  
We are interested in two complementary approaches: at one hand, we want to 
evaluate  the  impact  of  subsidies  on  the  probability  of  non-exporting  firms  to  begin 
exporting; at the other hand, we are interested in evaluating the effects of subsidies on 
the exporting performance of already exporters. 
In order to apply such methodology to the study of the causal effect of subsidies 
on starting to export, we consider as the treated group of firms, for every year from 
1998 to 2002, the firms which, in each year, fill the following cumulative conditions: (i) 
without subsidies two years before, (ii) without subsidies in the year before, (ii) with 
subsidies in the year considered, (iv) never exported until that year. The control group 
for each year is made by the firms which had not subsidies in the whole period 1996-
2002 and which did not export until the analyzed year. Appendix B presents the number 
of treated and control firms that were used. 
At the other hand, in order to study the causal effect of subsidies on the share of 
exports in total sales, we consider as treated group of firms, for every year from 1998 to 
2002, the firms which, in each year, fill the following cumulative conditions: (i) without 
subsidies two years before, (ii) without subsidies in the year before, (ii) with subsidies 
in the year considered, (iv) with exports in the previous year. The control group is made 
by  the  firms  which  have  not  subsidies  in  the  whole  period  1996-2002  and  which 
exported in the previous year. Appendix C presents the number of treated and control 
firms that were used for this test. 
In order to apply matching procedures we must start by estimating the propensity 
score. Ideally, it would be important, as a first step, to select as control firms those that 
show the most identical features to the treated group of firms. The control group of 
firms should have n-1 (out of n) similar features to the treated group and differ only in 10 
 
the n
th feature, which would be the fact that some were subsidized in that year and 
others don´t. In fact, the true purpose of matching is to pair each new subsidized firm, in 
each year – on the basis of some observable variables, named as covariates – with a 
larger control group of firms that remain non-subsidized but had similar probabilities to 
receive such support. 
Given the potentially strong variety of firm observable variables that may be used 
to pair treated with non-treated firms (e.g., productivity, size, ownership, capital, sector 
or time effects), a problem of dimension of treatable variables arises. This problem is 
solved by computing an average index – the so called “propensity score” –, in line with 
the method of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). Using this propensity score, from among a 
large group of non-treated firms we are able to find the ones which happen to be the 
most similar to the new subsidized, on average terms and over the pre-treatment period. 
This  particular  propensity  score  is  performed  using  a  probit  regression  of  a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is subsidized (treated) in that year and 0 otherwise. 
Such dummy is, as a base model, regressed on several lagged one year
10 variables that 
are  assumed  to  be  relevant
11  in  the  selection  of  firms  to  be  subsidized:  number  of 
employees,  total  factor  productivity,  wages,  a  dummy  for  the  existence  of  R&D 
workforce, a foreign capital dummy, earnings, sales, two digit sectoral dummies. To 
free  up  the  functional  form  of  the  propensity  score  we  also  included  higher  order 
polynomials  and  interaction  terms.  Nevertheless,  in  the  search  of  the  higher  quality 
match,  different specifications were used for different years and that option revealed to 
be more adequate than using only a single specification for all time cohorts of treated 
and control firms; Appendixes D and E present the different propensity score probits 
that we used in each year for each of the two models. 
When performing these estimations in each year, we also observed the importance 
of  the  different  covariates  for  the  dependent  variables;  although  with  some 
heterogeneity we noticed some regularities as firms´ sector, previous importer status 
and  foreign  capital  share  were  most  frequently  important  factors  explaining  firms 
probability of  receiving subsidies (Appendix F). Otherwise, the efficiency level, the 
                                                           
10 In order to respect the Conditional Independence Assumption. 
11 Given that we are using general production subsidies and not specific ones we opt to consider as 
determinants for subsidy selection common variables mostly used on the previous empirical works on this 
subject (e.g., Girma et al., 2009 or Gorg et al. 2008). 11 
 
presence  of  R&D  within  the  firm  or  wages  were  not  significant  in  explaining  the 
probability of a firm to receive a subsidy.  
After propensity scores are obtained, several algorithms could be used to establish 
the match between treated and control firms. We tested, with similar results, the use of 
two  of  those  weighting  schemes:  kernel  matching  and  nearest  neighbour  matching. 
Kernel matching defines a neighbourhood for each treated observation and assigns a 
positive weight to all control observations within the neighbourhood while the weight is 
otherwise zero. By using more observations, kernel matching reduces the variance of 
the estimator as compared to the nearest neighbour and produces less bias. The nearest 
neighbour algorithm matches a starter with a single “non starter” that has the closest 
propensity score; thus, given their properties on variance, we will present results based 
on the Epanechnikov kernel.
12 
At this stage, after propensity score matching is performed, there is the need to 
evaluate the matching quality; this means to compare the average level of the covariates 
in  the  pre-treatment  period,  before  and  after  matching  and  to  look  for  differences 
between treated and control units. If there are differences between the matched control 
sample and treated firms, the matching was not fully successful. We implemented a 
balancing test proposed by Becker and Ichino (2002) and a standard T-test for equality 
of  means.  In  the  former  test,  we  split  the  sample  into  intervals  so  that  the  average 
propensity score for the treated and the control does not differ in each interval. Then, 
within each interval, we checked that the means of each feature do not differ between 
treated and control units. We made sure that the balancing property is satisfied for every 
specification of the propensity score (and thus for each cohort of starters and controls 
separately). For the second test, we performed a standard T-test for equality of means of 
the  covariates  to  check  if  significant  differences  remain  after  conditioning  on  the 
propensity score. We computed the T-test for the mean values at t-1 (the year before 
subsidies are received). The quality of the matching is confirmed as in Appendixes D 
and E is evident the high percentage reduction in bias between treated and controls 
achieved  after  the  matching,  thus  ensuring  we  choose  the  right  specification  for 
propensity score. We also ensure the common support condition which means that we 
                                                           
12 We use a bandwith of 0,001. Moreover, the results show little sensivity on the weighting regime used 
or on the bandwith interval. 12 
 
drop subsidy starters which presented in each year a propensity score higher (lower) 
than the maximum (minimum) score of non-subsidized firms.  
Given  that  our  purpose  is  to  evaluate  the  effects  of  subsidies  on  both  the 
probability to a domestic firms to begin exporting and on the export share of total sales 
of already exporters we compute
13 the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) as 
follows: (i) for the first case we are interested in the differences between the percentage 
of export starters (the outcome variable) among the subsidized firms (treated) and the 
same  percentage  for  non  treated  firms;  (ii)  for  the  second  case  ATT  means  the 
difference in the change of the export share of total sales (the outcome in question) 
between  the  treated  firms  (new  subsidized  in each  year)  and  the  same  outcome  for 
matched non treated firms (firms that remain non-subsidized in that year). We assess 
ATT  both  for  the  year  in  analysis  (year  t)  and  for  the  next  one  (year  t+1).    When 
performing  that  second  ATT  we  are  controlling  for  unobservable,  time-invariant 
differences  between  treated  and  untreated  firms,  thus,  in  practice  we  implement  a 
difference-in-differences matching estimator, as suggested by Blundell and Costa Dias 
(2000) and Heckman et al. (1998). So, we compare the change in exports´ performance 
between the group of new subsidized and the most similar group of non-subsidized 
firms.  Results for causal effects of subsidies on starting to export reported in Table 6.  
  Table 6 - Causal effects of subsidies on starting to export, 1998-2002 
 
 













































Source: Own calculations.  
Notes: We report bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications). If nothing mentioned coefficients are 
significant at 1%.
**: mean significant at least at 5%. 
* means coefficients are significant at least at 10%. 
+ 
means coefficients are not significant.  
                                                           
13 We use psmatch2 command (version 3.0) for Stata 10.1 13 
 
Although varying in accordance to the specific year, we find little evidence of subsidies 
to cause domestic firms to start exporting. Moreover, that effect is even lower one year 
after the subsidy was received. The only exception is the year 2000, in which subsidies 
seem to generate a higher probability of exporting. Curiously, we notice that in 2000 the 
subsidy per employee was the highest for all studied years, giving rise to the speculation 
that causal effects depend on the subsidy level per capita 
 
Results for the causal effects of subsidies on the share of exports in total sales are 
reported in Table 7. There is no evidence, for all years, that subsidies cause any increase 
in exports´ share of total sales. This absence of effects occurs both for the year subsidies 
start and for the next one. Although not reported, we have also tested similar effects for 
two years after the subsidy reception but the effects are still none.  
Table 7 - Causal effects of subsidies on export shares, 1998-2002 
 
 

















































Source: Own calculations.  
Notes: We report bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications). If nothing mentioned coefficients are 
significant at 1%.
**: mean significant at least at 5%. 
* means coefficients are significant at least at 10%. 
+ 
means coefficients are not significant 
 
Given that subsidies present a considerable heterogeneity in what respects values per 
employee and average levels by year (Table 3) and by industrial sector (Appendix A), it 
would be of interest to perform an analysis of  subsidies´ effects using  not a binary 
treatment  approach  as  we  do,  but  instead  a  continuous  treatment  approach,  varying 
between  zero  and  a  certain  maximum  amount.  However,  the  use  of  a  generalized 
propensity  score  is  hampered  by  the  highly  skewed  distribution  of  subsidies  per 





Note: subspc means subsidies per employee 
Nevertheless, in order to study the impact of subsidy level on the causality nexus 
for the probability of exporting and for the export share in total sales, we repeated all 
previous tests but with one difference: we add an additional condition to treated firms – 
treated firms had to have received, in each year, a subsidy per employee higher than the 
double of each year´s average subsidy per employee – in order to evaluate only highly 
subsidized firms and not all subsidized firms. 
This  computation  meant  a  reduction  in  the  number  of  “treated  firms”  by  an 
average of 40% given the initial number. The results of such causality effects of high 
subsidies on the usual two dependent variables are expressed in Tables 8 and 9.  
Table 8 - Causal effects of high subsidies p.e. on starting to export, 1998-2002 
 
 



























2002  0  -0.111
+ 
(0.23) 
Source: Own calculations 
Notes: We report bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications). If nothing mentioned coefficients are 
significant at 1%.
**: mean significant at least at 5%. 
* means coefficients are significant at least at 10%. 
+ 
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In what concerns the causal effects of subsidies on the probability of domestic 
firms  to  begin  exporting  no  difference  exists  between  Tables  8  and  6  –  in  general, 
subsidies do not create higher propensity to start exporting, whatever level the subsidy 
per employee reaches. In fact, as in Table 6 there are only evidences of positive effects 
of subsidies for firms receiving grants in 2002, the year of highest level of subsidies per 
employee. 
Differently, the comparison between Tables 9 and 7 suggests that higher levels of 
subsidies per employee generate a stronger increasing effect on export shares of already 
exporters, suggesting that exporting firms receiving important subsidies may be able to 
overcome high entry costs associated with difficult markets and thus taking good care of 
such supports by increasing the quality of products, lowering their exporting prices or 
both. In fact, while in Table 7 there was no evidence of any positive effects of subsidies, 
in Table 9 almost half of the observations suggest that higher levels of subsidies per 
employee induce increases in exports´ share in total sales.    
Table 9 - Causal effects of high subsidies p.e. on export shares, 1998-2002 
 
 









































Source: Own calculations.  
Notes: We report bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications). If nothing mentioned coefficients are 
significant at 1%.
**: mean significant at least at 5%. 
* means coefficients are significant at least at 10%. 
+ 
means coefficients are not significant 
 
 
Additionally, in order to take advantage of a sectoral analysis for the whole period 
1998-2002 we pooled all year cohorts and perform a separate ATT for each of the 23 
two digit industry sectors available. In what concerns the study of the probability of 
starting to export for domestic firms the very limited number of observations, for some 
sectors, did not allow us to perform all such analysis; nevertheless, we notice that the 
probability of domestic firms to become exporters was only confirmed for the group of 
sectors related with the machinery cluster, involving all types of machines (electrical 16 
 
type,  office  type,  motor  vehicles  and  general  machinery).  Inversely,  for  food  and 
beverage  sector  the  subsidies  reduced  the  probability  of  domestic  firms  to  become 
exporters. For all other sectors no evidence of any kind of effects was noticed.  
As  for  the  change  in  export  shares  of  already  exporters,  the  number  of 
observations available allowed us to perform ATT computations for the majority of two 
digit industrial sectors. Results in Appendix G show that on one hand, there are positive 
effects of subsidies in export shares for basic metals, general machinery and electrical 
machinery;  at  the  other  hand,  some  sectors  testify  negative  effects  of  subsidies  on 
export share of total sales: food and beverages, textiles, pulp and paper, fabricated metal 
products.  However,  given  the  limitations  of  the  dimension  of  our  sample  for  most 
groups, additional precaution is needed in what concerns general conclusions.     
 
6. Assessing the effects of subsidies in general firms´ performances 
 
Given  that  production  subsidies  present  in  our  database  are  not  specifically 
oriented to export enhancing but aim, in general
14, to promote employment, to support 
specific industries eventually in specific region and to help specific firms in difficulties 
it would be of most interest to analyze their impact on general firm performances.  
According to Community European Treaty
15, state aids to firms have in common 
the fact that they are granted by a member State or through State resources, they favor 
certain undertakings or the production of certain goods, but also distort or threaten to 
distort competition and they affect trade between member States. This definition clearly 
includes the idea that state interventions could be necessary in order to reach a better 
allocation of resources but simultaneously they may harm the competition environment 
with negative consequences. In this framework the consequences of subsidies to firms 
either could be positive or negative and previous studies are not sufficient to support a 
clear statement on what´s to be expected on this issue.  
Gadd et al. (2009) present a summary on previous research on this subject: on one 
hand,  some  positive  effects  on  employment  and  on  the  dynamics  of  turnover  and 
employment are reported for subsidized firms; at the other hand, negative effects on 
productivity growth rates are also observed in subsidized firms. The very study of Gaad 
                                                           
14 In this paper we do not refer to R&D subsidies on firms´ innovation activities. 
15 http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/legislation/aid3.html 17 
 
et al. (2009) for Swedish firms, using a propensity score matching approach, concluded 
that subsidies enhanced employment growth levels of subsidized firms but there was no 
positive effect on firms´ productivity.  
Using  our  database  for  Portuguese  manufacturing  firms  (1996-2003)  we 
performed other ATT computations for the subsidies effects on several other variables: 
earnings, sales, employment and total factor productivity. Results of Tables 10 present 
subsidies  effects  on  domestic  firms  and  Table  11  presents  the  same  effects  but  on 
already exporters. 
For  both  types  of  firms,  we  can  observe,  for  most  years,  positive  effects  on 
employment; these positive effects are stronger one year after subsidy is received and 
weaker on the same year firms get subsidies. No effects of subsidies are reported on 
earnings  and  on  total  factors  productivity.  In  what  concerns  sales,  there  are 
contradictory effects as for most cases there are negative effects in the following year 
subsidy is received but also some positive effects are noticed 
Table 10 - Causal effects of subsidies on earnings, sales, productivity and employment, 













































































































































Source: Own calculations.  
Notes: We report bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications). If nothing mentioned coefficients are 
significant at 1%.
**: mean significant at least at 5%. 
* means coefficients are significant at least at 10%. 
+ 
means coefficients are not significant 
 
Overall, effects (both positive and negative) seem to be more robust for domestic 
firms than for already exporters. Moreover, such superior strength of subsidies´ effects 
also seems to perform more clearly in the following year after subsidy reception than in 
the same year it occurs. 
 18 
 
Table 11 - Causal effects of subsidies on earnings, sales, productivity and employment,  













































































































































Source: Own calculations.  
Notes: We report bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications). If nothing mentioned coefficients are 
significant at 1%.
**: mean significant at least at 5%. 
* means coefficients are significant at least at 10%. 
+ 
means coefficients are not significant 
 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper investigates, for the first time for Portuguese firms, the link between 
production-subsidies  and  exports.  Although  positively  related  those  variables´ 
connections may suffer from endogeneity and sample selection. Thus, in order to really 
uncover their relationship we apply a propensity score matching approach to reveal the 
causal effects of subsidies on exports. In this sequence, we found that subsidies received 
by  domestic  firms  had  no  impact  on  their  capacity  to  become  exporters  and  that 
subsidies granted to already exporters show no significant effects on their exporting 
performances.  Nevertheless,  we  also  found  some  evidence  that  highly  subsidized 
exporters (relative to per employee levels) improve their exporting performances.  
 Our findings are consistent with the other two known related studies for Germany 
and Ireland: both works also suggest that production subsidies may be used by firms to 
improve their exporting abilities through enhanced production skills and reduced selling 
prices but subsidies seem to be less effective in helping domestic firms to deal with 
sunk costs of foreign markets eventually because the nature of the firms´ main difficulty 
is not a financial one but rather relies on informational skills. At a complementary level 
we also found subsidies to have small impact on firms´ sales, total productivity and 
earnings; employment seems to be the only variable for which some positive effects of 
subsidies are noticed, in line with previous research for other countries. Further research 
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APPENDIX A – Average 1996 - 2003 
Sector 
code 




15  Food, beverages   3.1  2870 
17  Textiles  0.6  250 
18  Wearing apparel  1.1  263 
19  Leather  0.6  223 
20  Wood  0.7  338 
21  Pulp and paper  0.3  280 
22  Printing  2.2  652 
24  Chemicals  0.6  567 
25  Rubber,  plastic  0.4  285 
26  Non-metalic mineral product  0.8  307 
27  Basic metals  0.3  191 
28  Fabricated metal products  0.5  230 
29  Machinery  0.6  256 
30  Office machinery and computers  0.7  585 
31  Electrical machinery  0.3  223 
32  TV and communication equipment  0.5  330 
33  Medical,  precision  and  optical 
instruments 
0.8  438 
34  Motor vehicles  0.9  390 
35  Other transport equipment  1.2  802 
36  Furniture  4.4  302 
37  Recycling  11.2  3204 
  Average  1.4  891 







APPENDIX B – Treated and control firms for matching (Export starting) 
 
 
TREATED  CONTROL 
1998  22  160 
1999  17  261 
2000  14  172 
2001  11  125 
2002  15  114 
Source: Own calculations 
Note: firms without subsidies in each year: 677 
 
 
APPENDIX C – Treated and control firms for matching (Export share) 
 
 
TREATED  CONTROL 
1998  108  478 
1999  132  491 
2000  78  478 
2001  75  482 
2002  78  483 
Source: Own calculations 




APPENDIX D – Probit model used in each year (export beginning) 
Year  Covariates used and % reduction bias 
1998  R&D(96%), number of employees (11%), forcap (99%), imp (15%), wages 93%), 
tfp (29%), sales (93%), pscore (99%) 
1999  Sectoral dummies, number of employees (18%), sales (50%), imp (96%), forcap 
(31%.), wages (10%), tfp (11%), pscore (98%) 
2000  Sectoral dummies, number of employees (18%), sales (50%), imp (96%), forcap 
(31%.), wages (10%), tfp (11%), pscore (98%) 
2001  Number of employees (58%), sales (15%), wages (80%), tfp (91%), pscore (99%) 
 
2002  Sectoral dummies, number of employees (88%), sales (98%), tfp (61%), pscore 
(82%) 
Note: for each year we present also the propensity score reduction bias after matching 
pscore means that covariate has no sufficient observations 












APPENDIX E – Probit model used in each year (export share) 
Year  Covariates used and % reduction bias 
1998  Sectoral dummies; R&D (96%), number of employees (25%), wages (43%), imp 
(95%), sales (27%), pscore (99%) 
1999  Sectoral dummies; R&D (26%), number of employees (85%), wages (18%), imp 
(85%), sales (97%), tfp (65%) pscore (99%) 
2000  Sectoral dummies; R&D (39%), number of employees (95%), forcap (35%.), wages 
(68%), imp (96%), sales (92%), pscore (99%) 
2001  R&D  (69%),  number  of  employees  (20%),  forcap  (26%.),  wages  (83%),  imp 
(93%), sales (25%), pscore (96%) 
2002  Sectoral dummies (92%),  number of employees (82%), wages (80%), tfp (71%), 
pscore (99%) 
Note: for each year we present also the propensity score reduction bias after matching 
n.a.: means that covariate has no sufficient observations 










1998  R&D (+), Imports (+), 
1999  Imports (+), forcap (+) 
2000  Sectoral dummies; 
2001  Sectoral dummies; Imports (+) 
2002  Sectoral dummies; forcap 






































15  Food, beverages   -0.07
+  -0.259  0.002
+  -0.134
* 





18  Wearing apparel      -0.469
+  -0.078
+ 
19  Leather      -0.103
+  0.249
+ 
20  Wood  0  0  -0.079
+  0.275
+ 
21  Pulp and paper      -0.338
*  -0.053
** 
22  Printing      0.029
+  -0.005
+ 
24  Chemicals      -0.082
+  -0.053
+ 
25  Rubber,  plastic      -0.782
+  -0.806
+ 
26  Non-metalic mineral 
product 
    0.151
+  -0.094
+ 
27  Basic metals      0.147
+  0.211
* 
28  Fabricated  metal 
products 
    -2.145
*  -2.219
* 
29  Machinery      -0.262
+  0.652
+ 
30  Office  machinery 
and computers 
    n.a.  n.a. 
31  Electrical machinery      0.902
*  -0.153
+ 
32  TV,  communication 
equipment 
    -0.015
+  -0,152
+ 
33  Medical,  precision, 
optical instruments 
    -0.015
+  -0,152
+ 
34  Motor vehicles      -7.841
+  -10.12
+ 
35  Other  transport 
equipment 
    n.a.  n.a. 
36  Furniture      -1.65
+  0.082
+ 
37  Recycling      n.a.  n.a. 
  Source: Own calculations Recent FEP Working Papers 
 
Nº 382 
Óscar Afonso, Pedro Neves and Maria Thompsom, “Costly Investment, 
Complementarities, International Technological-Knowledge Diffusion and the Skill 
Premium”, July 2010 
Nº 381 
Pedro Cunha Neves and Sandra Tavares Silva, “Inequality and Growth: Uncovering the 
main conclusions from the empirics”, July 2010 
Nº 380 
Isabel Soares and Paula Sarmento, “Does Unbundling Really Matter? The 
Telecommunications and Electricity Cases”, July 2010 
Nº 379 
António Brandão and Joana Pinho, “Asymmetric information and exchange of 
information about product differentiation”, June 2010 
Nº 378 
Mónica Meireles, Isabel Soares and Óscar Afonso, “Economic Growth, Ecological 
Technology and Public Intervention”, June 2010 
Nº 377 
Nuno Torres, Óscar Afonso and Isabel Soares, “The connection between oil and 
economic growth revisited”, May 2010 
Nº 376 
Ricardo Correia and Carlos Brito, “O Marketing e o Desenvolvimento Turístico: O Caso 
de Montalegre”, May 2010 
Nº 375 
Maria D.M. Oliveira and Aurora A.C. Teixeira, “The determinants of technology transfer 
efficiency and the role of innovation policies: a survey”, May 2010 
Nº 374 
João Correia-da-Silva and Carlos Hervés-Beloso, “Two-period economies with private 
state verification”, May 2010 
Nº 373 
Armando Silva, Óscar Afonso and Ana Paula Africano, “Do Portuguese manufacturing 
firms learn by exporting?”, April 2010 
Nº 372 
Ana Maria Bandeira and Óscar Afonso, “Value of intangibles arising from R&D activities”, 
April 2010 
Nº 371 
Armando Silva, Óscar Afonso and Ana Paula Africano, “Do Portuguese manufacturing 
firms self select to exports?”, April 2010 
Nº 370 
Óscar Afonso, Sara Monteiro and Maria Thompson, “A Growth Model for the Quadruple 
Helix Innovation Theory”, April 2010 
Nº 369 
Armando Silva, Óscar Afonso and Ana Paula Africano, “Economic performance and 
international trade engagement: the case of Portuguese manufacturing firms”, April 
2010 
Nº 368 
Andrés Carvajal and João Correia-da-Silva, “Agreeing to Disagree with Multiple Priors”, 
April 2010 
Nº 367  Pedro Gonzaga, “Simulador de Mercados de Oligopólio”, March 2010 
Nº 366 
Aurora A.C. Teixeira and Luís Pinheiro, “The process of emergency, evolution, and 
sustainability of University-Firm relations in a context of open innovation ”, March 2010 
Nº 365 
Miguel Fonseca, António Mendonça and José Passos, “Home Country Trade Effects of 
Outward FDI: an analysis of the Portuguese case, 1996-2007”, March 2010 
Nº 364 
Armando Silva, Ana Paula Africano and Óscar Afonso, “Learning-by-exporting: what we 
know and what we would like to know”, March 2010 
Nº 363 
Pedro Cosme da Costa Vieira, “O problema do crescente endividamento de Portugal à 
luz da New Macroeconomics”, February 2010 
Nº 362 
Argentino Pessoa, “Reviewing PPP Performance in Developing Economies”, February 
2010 
Nº 361 
Ana Paula Africano, Aurora A.C. Teixeira and André Caiado, “The usefulness of State 
trade missions for the internationalization of firms: an econometric analysis”, February 
2010 
Nº 360 
Beatriz Casais and João F. Proença, “Inhibitions and implications associated with 
celebrity participation in social marketing programs focusing on HIV prevention: an 
exploratory research”, February 2010 
Nº 359 
Ana Maria Bandeira, “Valorização de activos intangíveis resultantes de actividades de 
I&D”, February 2010 
Nº 358 
Maria Antónia Rodrigues and João F. Proença, “SST and the Consumer Behaviour in 
Portuguese Financial Services”, January 2010 
Nº 357  Carlos Brito and Ricardo Correia, “Regions as Networks: Towards a Conceptual Framework of Territorial Dynamics”, January 2010 
Nº 356 
Pedro Rui Mazeda Gil, Paulo Brito and Óscar Afonso, “Growth and Firm Dynamics with 
Horizontal and Vertical R&D”, January 2010 
Nº 355 
Aurora A.C. Teixeira and José Miguel Silva, “Emergent and declining themes in the 
Economics and Management of Innovation scientific area over the past three decades”, 
January 2010 
Nº 354 
José Miguel Silva and Aurora A.C. Teixeira, “Identifying the intellectual scientific basis of 
the Economics and Management of Innovation Management area”, January 2010 
Nº 353 
Paulo Guimarães, Octávio Figueiredo and Douglas Woodward, “Accounting for 
Neighboring Effects in Measures of Spatial Concentration”, December 2009 
Nº 352 
Vasco Leite, Sofia B.S.D. Castro and João Correia-da-Silva, “A third sector in the core-
periphery model: non-tradable goods”, December 2009 
Nº 351 
João Correia-da-Silva and Joana Pinho, “Costly horizontal differentiation”, December 
2009 
Nº 350 
João Correia-da-Silva and Joana Resende, “Free daily newspapers: too many incentives 
to print?”, December 2009 
Nº 349 
Ricardo Correia and Carlos Brito, “Análise Conjunta da Dinâmica Territorial e Industrial: 
O Caso da IKEA – Swedwood”, December 2009 
Nº 348 
Gonçalo Faria, João Correia-da-Silva and Cláudia Ribeiro, “Dynamic Consumption and 
Portfolio Choice with Ambiguity about Stochastic Volatility”, December 2009 
Nº 347 
André Caiado, Ana Paula Africano and Aurora A.C. Teixeira, “Firms’ perceptions on the 
usefulness of State trade missions: an exploratory micro level empirical analysis”, 
December 2009 
Nº 346 
Luís Pinheiro and Aurora A.C. Teixeira, “Bridging University-Firm relationships and Open 
Innovation literature: a critical synthesis”, November 2009 
Nº 345 
Cláudia Carvalho, Carlos Brito and José Sarsfield Cabral, “Assessing the Quality of Public 
Services: A Conceptual Model”, November 2009 
Nº 344 
Margarida Catarino and Aurora A.C. Teixeira, “International R&D cooperation: the 
perceptions of SMEs and Intermediaries”, November 2009 
Nº 343 
Nuno Torres, Óscar Afonso and Isabel Soares, “Geographic oil concentration and 
economic growth – a panel data analysis”, November 2009 
Nº 342  Catarina Roseira and Carlos Brito, “Value Co-Creation with Suppliers”, November 2009 
Nº 341 
José Fernando Gonçalves and Paulo S. A. Sousa, “A Genetic Algorithm for Lot Size and 
Scheduling under Capacity Constraints and Allowing Backorders”, November 2009 
Nº 340 
Nuno Gonçalves and Ana Paula Africano, “The Immigration and Trade Link in the 
European Union Integration Process”, November 2009 
Nº 339 
Filomena Garcia and Joana Resende, “Conformity based behavior and the dynamics of 
price competition: a new rational for fashion shifts”, October 2009 
Nº 338 
Nuno Torres, Óscar Afonso and Isabel Soares, “Natural resources, economic growth and 
institutions – a panel approach”, October 2009 
Nº 337 
Ana Pinto Borges, João Correia-da-Silva and Didier Laussel, “Regulating a monopolist 
with unknown bureaucratic tendencies”, October 2009 
Nº 336 
Pedro Rui Mazeda Gil, “Animal Spirits and the Composition of Innovation in a Lab-
Equipment R&D Model”, September 2009 
Nº 335 
Cristina Santos and Aurora A.C. Teixeira, “The evolution of the literature on 
entrepreneurship. Uncovering some under researched themes”, September 2009 
 
 
Editor: Sandra Silva (sandras@fep.up.pt) 
Download available at: 
http://www.fep.up.pt/investigacao/workingpapers/  








































































































￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿